Civil Defence Observations Worth Considering, Some Lessons from the War in Ukraine
The war in Ukraine has provided extensive real-world experience relevant to civil defence, civilian shelters and the resilience of buildings and critical infrastructure.
Repeated attacks on cities and infrastructure, recurring air-raid alerts and interruptions to electricity, heating, water and communications have demonstrated that civil protection involves considerably more than the construction of a strong underground space.
The experience also highlights practical questions concerning how quickly people can reach protection, how shelters function during repeated or longer periods of use, how essential services can continue when external infrastructure is disrupted, and how existing buildings and underground spaces can contribute to wider civil-defence preparedness.
For countries reviewing their own civil-defence systems, these observations can provide useful additional information.
They should not, however, be interpreted as universal recommendations or as proposals to replace existing national civil-defence requirements. Every country has different legislation, threat assessments, geography, building practices, warning times, existing infrastructure and available resources.
Experience from Ukraine can instead be considered alongside established national systems, applicable standards, local conditions and project-specific requirements.
1. A Shelter Is One Part of a Wider Civil-Defence System
A protected structure does not operate in isolation.
Its walls, floors, ceilings and protective doors may be the most visible elements, but practical operation can also depend on ventilation, electrical power, water, sanitation, communications, emergency lighting, access routes and warning systems.
The disruption of essential infrastructure during the war in Ukraine has demonstrated why these supporting systems can become important during an emergency.
For shelter planning, this provides a useful reminder to look beyond structural protection alone.
A complete civil-defence concept may need to consider several interconnected elements: physical protection, warning and communications, ventilation and air management, electrical supply and backup power, water and sanitation, emergency supplies, medical provisions, access and evacuation, and procedures for operating the facility.
Which of these are required—and to what level—depends on the purpose of the shelter, applicable regulations and the relevant risk assessment.
2. Protection Must Be Reachable in the Available Time
A shelter can provide effective protection only if people can reach it when it is needed.
This makes the relationship between warning time, distance and accessibility particularly important.
The appropriate solution can vary considerably between countries and threat scenarios. Where sufficient warning time is available, people may be able to move to larger communal shelters. Where warning times are short, protected spaces located closer to where people live, work or study can become increasingly important.
Repeated alerts add another practical consideration. A shelter located at an acceptable distance may still become difficult to use if people need to travel to it repeatedly throughout the day or night.
This can be particularly important for children, elderly people, people with reduced mobility, hospital patients and anyone requiring assistance.
A useful principle for civil-defence planning is therefore:
As the available response time decreases, the practical importance of nearby and readily accessible protection increases.
Protection level, shelter distribution, accessibility and warning time should therefore be
considered together rather than always treated as separate questions.
3. Different Situations May Require Different Levels of Protection
Not every building, location or function faces the same risks.
Experience from Ukraine demonstrates that civil protection can involve different types and levels of protected spaces rather than relying on a single shelter concept for every situation.
A residential building, school, hospital, industrial facility, emergency-service facility and critical-infrastructure site may each require a different approach.
Depending on national requirements and project-specific risk assessments, relevant considerations may include blast effects, fragmentation, structural failure, radioactive contamination, chemical or other CBRN hazards, fire, flooding, loss of utilities and secondary effects.
The objective is therefore not automatically to maximize every protective characteristic.
An appropriate protection level should reflect the applicable regulations, credible hazards and intended function of the protected space.
4. Protection Level and Population Coverage Should Be Considered Together
Civil defence also involves the practical allocation of available resources.
This creates an important planning question:
Should available resources provide a very high level of protection to a smaller number of people, or an appropriate but more basic level of protection to a considerably larger part of the population?
There is no universal answer.
Higher-performance shelters generally require greater investment in structures, protective doors, ventilation, filtration, utilities and other systems. With limited resources, concentrating investment in such facilities may reduce the total number of protected spaces or increase the distance people need to travel to reach them.
A wider network of simpler protected spaces may not provide the same performance against every threat, but it may improve geographic coverage and allow more people to reach protection quickly.
For this reason, protection level can be considered together with capacity, distribution, accessibility, warning time and available resources.
In some environments, a layered approach may be appropriate: broadly distributed protection for the population combined with higher-performance facilities where the level of risk, concentration of people or operational importance requires them.
Hospitals, emergency services, command facilities and certain critical infrastructure, for example, may require different levels of protection from ordinary residential buildings.
The wider civil-defence question is therefore not simply how strong an individual shelter can be, but also how effectively available resources can provide meaningful protection across the population.
5. Existing Underground Structures Can Be Part of the Solution
Building an entirely new network of dedicated shelters is not always practical, particularly in established urban areas.
Existing underground structures may therefore deserve consideration.
Basements, underground parking facilities and other below-ground spaces can sometimes provide useful protective characteristics or offer a starting point for conversion or modernization.
The experience of Ukraine has demonstrated the practical value that existing underground spaces can have when additional protection is required.
However, an important technical distinction should always be maintained:
An underground space is not automatically a civil-defence shelter.
Its suitability depends on factors such as structural resistance, entrances, emergency exits, ventilation openings, protective doors, penetrations, utilities, drainage, fire safety and the threats against which protection is required.
Where an existing structure is suitable, adaptation and modernization can nevertheless provide a practical method of increasing protective capacity without constructing an entirely new facility.
6. Dual-Purpose Structures Can Combine Everyday Use with Emergency Protection
Civil-defence infrastructure may remain unused for its protective purpose for long periods.
This creates a practical argument for spaces that provide an everyday function while also being designed or adapted to provide protection during an emergency.
Depending on national requirements, such concepts can include underground parking facilities, storage areas, sports or communal spaces and other parts of buildings capable of being prepared for protective use.
The principle can be particularly relevant in dense urban environments, where dedicated shelter space is expensive and where making practical everyday use of protected areas may improve the feasibility of civil-defence investment.
The experience of Ukraine has further demonstrated the potential value of using existing and dual-purpose spaces as part of a wider protection network.
7. Repeated Shelter Use Places Greater Emphasis on Habitability
There is an important difference between entering a shelter briefly during an exceptional event and using protected spaces repeatedly over an extended period.
Ukraine has provided considerable practical experience of the second situation.
When shelters are used frequently or for longer periods, the distinction between protective performance and practical habitability becomes increasingly important.
A structurally protected space may still become difficult to use if ventilation, temperature, sanitation, drinking water, lighting, seating, communications or emergency power are inadequate.
The longer people may need to remain inside—or the more frequently they must use the space—the more important these practical considerations can become.
Schools, hospitals and other facilities where large numbers of people may need to remain protected can place particularly demanding requirements on these systems.
Shelter planning may therefore need to consider not only whether a space provides the required physical protection, but also whether it can practically support the people expected to use it for the required period.
8. Some Protected Spaces May Need to Support Continued Operations
In certain buildings, moving people into protection is only part of the requirement.
Important functions may also need to continue while an alert or emergency is in progress.
This consideration can be particularly relevant to hospitals, emergency services, communications facilities, government functions, schools and certain industrial operations.
For these projects, designers may need to ask:
Which functions need to continue after people enter the protected area?
The answer can influence space requirements, electrical systems, ventilation, communications, sanitation, equipment and redundancy.
A hospital protected area, for example, may have very different operational requirements from a residential shelter. A protected command facility may require independent communications and power, while a school shelter may need arrangements suitable for larger groups of children.
Not every shelter requires operational-continuity capability. Where continuity is important, however, it is generally more effective to consider these requirements during the design stage rather than attempting to add them later.
9. External Utilities Should Not Always Be Assumed to Remain Available
Modern buildings depend heavily on external electricity, water, communications and other services.
An emergency affecting a city can disrupt these systems at the same time that shelters are required.
The experience of Ukraine has provided numerous practical examples of essential infrastructure being disrupted and alternative or backup systems becoming necessary.
For shelters and protected facilities, the degree of independence required should be determined by applicable standards, expected duration of use and project-specific risk assessments.
Where appropriate, designers may consider a hierarchy such as:
normal supply → backup supply → emergency or manual capability
Ventilation, for example, may require an alternative operating method during loss of electrical power. Communications and emergency lighting may require independent power sources. Water storage may be necessary where continuity of the external supply cannot be relied upon.
The appropriate level of redundancy will differ considerably between projects.
10. Protection Is Determined by the Entire Protective Envelope
Reinforced concrete is only one part of a protected structure.
Every opening through the protective boundary can influence overall performance.
These openings may include entrances, emergency exits, ventilation ducts, air intakes and exhausts, cable routes, water pipes, drainage lines and other utility penetrations.
Depending on the required protection level, these interfaces may require specialized solutions such as blast-resistant doors and hatches, blast valves, overpressure valves, protected ventilation openings, gastight ductwork and properly designed wall penetrations.
This leads to an important engineering principle:
A shelter should be considered as an integrated protective system.
Strong walls combined with inadequately protected openings may not provide the intended overall performance. Structural, mechanical and protective components therefore need to function together as part of the same protection concept.
11. Long-Term Civil Defence May Need to Address More Than Conventional Attack
Many of the most visible observations from Ukraine relate to conventional weapons, blast effects, fragmentation, damaged buildings and disruption of infrastructure.
Civil-defence facilities, however, are generally intended to remain available for many years.
Their design may therefore need to consider a wider range of hazards where required by national regulations and local risk assessments.
These can include radioactive contamination, industrial chemical releases and other CBRN scenarios.
Risk can vary considerably by location. Areas close to industrial sites, transport infrastructure or facilities handling hazardous substances may require different considerations from ordinary residential developments.
The broader observation is that experience from one conflict can provide valuable information for civil-defence planning without becoming the only basis for determining future protection requirements.
12. Accessibility Should Be Considered as Part of Protection
Technical protection is useful only when people can actually reach and enter the protected area.
This is particularly relevant in hospitals, schools, care facilities and buildings used by people with limited mobility.
A practical assessment can consider the complete movement sequence:
warning → route to protection → entrance → protected area → emergency exit
Travel distance, stairs, ramps, door dimensions, congestion and the movement of wheelchairs, stretchers or medical equipment can all influence how quickly people reach protection.
Repeated shelter use makes these practical considerations particularly visible.
Accessibility is therefore not simply a question of convenience. Depending on the facility, it can directly affect the practical effectiveness of the overall protection concept.
13. A Shelter Must Remain Ready Throughout Its Service Life
Civil-defence structures can remain in buildings for decades.
During that time, ventilation equipment can deteriorate, valves can become difficult to operate, filters can exceed specified storage conditions, protective doors may no longer operate correctly, documentation can disappear and later building modifications can compromise the original protective envelope.
Spaces intended for shelter use can also gradually become occupied by storage or converted to other functions.
For this reason, civil-defence capability cannot be evaluated solely by whether a shelter exists on a drawing or in a building register.
Long-term readiness depends on inspection, maintenance, testing, documentation and clear responsibility for operating the shelter.
A well-designed shelter provides its intended protection only when its systems remain functional and the facility can actually be brought into use when required.
What Can Be Considered from the Ukrainian Experience?
Ukraine should not be treated as a template that every other country should reproduce.
Civil-defence systems develop around different national circumstances. Expected threats, geography, population distribution, existing building stock, warning times, legislation, economic resources and historical experience all influence how protection is organized.
What Ukraine does provide is extensive modern, real-world experience from which practical observations can be made.
Several considerations appear particularly relevant when reviewing civil-defence concepts:
protection should be reachable within the available warning time;
different risks and facilities may require different levels of protection;
technical performance should be considered together with population coverage and available resources;
existing underground structures may provide opportunities for adaptation and modernization;
dual-purpose facilities can combine everyday use with emergency protection;
repeated or extended shelter use increases the importance of habitability;
certain facilities may need to continue essential operations from protected areas;
dependence on external utilities should be carefully assessed;
doors, ventilation systems and penetrations form part of the protective envelope;
accessibility influences practical protection; and
long-term inspection, maintenance and readiness remain essential.
These are not universal rules and do not replace national standards, legislation, risk assessments or project-specific engineering.
They are practical observations from real-world conditions that authorities, designers, building owners and civil-defence professionals may consider alongside applicable national requirements, local conditions, available resources and the intended purpose of each protected facility.
Atmas Group — Shelter Technologies Adapted to Modern Realities
Atmas Group is a Finnish company specializing in civil-defence shelters, protected facilities and protective technologies.
We support new construction as well as the renovation and modernization of existing shelters and protected facilities in international projects.
An important part of our work is the development and adaptation of protective technologies for both new and existing structures.
New construction allows protective systems to be incorporated into the building from the earliest design stages. Existing shelters present a different engineering challenge. Available space may be limited, ventilation systems and penetrations already exist, wall openings may be difficult to modify, and older equipment may need to remain partially in use.
For these projects, Atmas Group develops project-specific retrofit and modernization solutions intended to improve protection, functionality and readiness while making practical use of the existing structure and infrastructure.
Our solutions include CBRN filtration and ventilation, blast protection, blast-resistant doors and hatches, blast and overpressure valves, gastight systems, protected penetrations, CO₂ and air-management technologies, infrastructure protection and other specialized systems for shelters and protected facilities.
Our objective is not to apply one shelter concept everywhere.
Protective technologies should be adapted to the applicable national requirements, identified threats, building conditions and operational needs of each project.
Experience from established civil-defence systems, ongoing shelter projects and observations from real-world events such as the war in Ukraine can all contribute useful information when developing and improving protective solutions.
Effective civil protection starts with understanding the risks, the people who need protection, the time available to reach safety and the functions that may need to continue during an emergency. The appropriate technical solution should follow from these requirements.
For more information about civil-defence shelters, modernization and protective technologies, visit Atmas Group.
Note
This article presents general technical observations based on publicly available information and experience from civil-defence and shelter projects. It is intended for general informational purposes and does not replace applicable legislation, national civil-defence requirements, standards, project-specific risk assessments or professional engineering design.
Civil-defence requirements vary between countries and projects. Applicable regulations and technical requirements should always be verified for the specific location and application.
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